Virtual Dialogues with Latin America

Brazilian Political Crisis: What Happened? What Now?

College of Social & Behavioral Sciences
Latin American Studies

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Brazilian Political Crisis: What Happened? What Now?

The Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Arizona presents Brazilian Political Crisis: What Happened? What Now? as part of the Virtual Dialogues series. The event was made possible by a U.S. Department of Education Title UISFL Grant.

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Professor of Political Communication, POC-Rio

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Elizabeth Leeds
Senior Fellow at Washington Office on Latin America

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Senior Associate for International Policy at the Center for Economic and Policy Research

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**Antonio Bacelar da Silva** holds a Ph.D. in Linguistic and Sociocultural Anthropology from the University of Arizona. He is currently a Postdoctoral Research Associate in the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Arizona. He was a CAPES (Brazil) Postdoctoral Research and Teaching Fellow in the Graduate Studies in Language and Culture Program at the Universidade Federal da Bahia (Salvador, Brazil) from 2014-2016. During that period, he conducted ethnographic research on the impact of electoral campaigning with a race appeal on Afro-Brazilian voters in Salvador. Funded by CAPES and a Post-Ph.D. Wenner-Gren grant, this study focuses on Afro-Brazilians’ struggle to reconcile Brazil’s dominant ideology of race mixing, the obligations of liberal citizenship (to treat people as equal citizens), and government policies on affirmative action. Current research interests include the implications of the intersections of race, class, and citizenship on democratic participation in and beyond Brazil.

**Jennifer Roth-Gordon** is a linguistic and cultural anthropologist who has been conducting research in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil since 1995. Her book, *Race and the Brazilian Body: Blackness, Whiteness, and Everyday Language in Rio de Janeiro* (University of California Press, 2017) explores how racial ideas about the superiority of whiteness and the inferiority of blackness continue to play out in the daily lives of Rio de Janeiro’s residents. Her new research project, entitled *Bodies of Privilege: Cultivating Wealth and Whiteness in Rio de Janeiro*, investigates how race and class privilege are constructed and lived amongst Rio's whiter middle and upper-middle classes and how this privilege is taught and handed down to their children.
External Panelists

Arthur Ituassu is a Professor of Political Communication at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Doctorate in International Relations, Director of the Research Group in Communication, Internet and Politics (COMP) and of the Laboratory of Public Opinion, Political Communication and Social Media (ePOCS). Researcher at the Centre of Advanced Studies in Digital Democracy and Electronic Government (CEADD), Vice-President of the Brazilian Association of Political Communication Researchers (COMPOLÍTICA) and member of the World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR).

Elizabeth Leeds is currently a Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America to advise on public safety in Brazil. She is the founder and Honorary President of the Brazilian Forum for Public Safety, based in São Paulo, and a Research Affiliate at the Center for international Studies at MIT. She was a Program Officer for Governance and Civil Society at the Ford Foundation Brazil Office in Rio from 1997-2003 where she developed an initiative on Police Reform and Public Safety. Prior to that she was the Executive Director of the Center for International Studies (1989-1997) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) where she had previously received a doctorate in Political Science. Current research interests include challenges to institutional reform of the police and the role of civil society in that process.

Alex Main is the Senior Associate for International Policy at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. In his work at CEPR, Alexander focuses on U.S. policy in Latin America and the Caribbean and on economic and political developments throughout the region. His analyses have been published in a variety of media outlets such as the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Foreign Policy, NACLA and the Monde diplomatique. He is also regularly interviewed by international media including CNN en español, Democracy Now!, Al Jazeera English, Telemundo and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Prior to CEPR, Alexander spent more than six years in Latin America working as an international relations analyst and advisor. He has a degree in history and political science from the Sorbonne University in Paris, France.
A Dialectic Tradition: Brazil’s Re-Democratization Process and Consumers and the Country’s Current Political Crisis
by Arthur Ituassu

My intention here is to analyze the current political and economic crisis in Brazil as a context within the country's recent re-democratization historical and social process. I will try do this by: 1) contextualizing brazil’s political and economic transformation after the end of the cold war and the military regime in the country; 2) relating this changing processes and their tensions to the present situation; and 3) pointing reflections about the current crisis and the future developments of the Brazilian democracy. In the end, I plan to argue that the ongoing crisis is a byproduct of some democratic deficits within Brazilian political institutional and cultural framework yet to be dealt with.

As you know, Brazil experiences today grave political and economic crisis. Irresponsible expansionist practices during last presidency led to a fiscally broken state, very high interest rates and inflation, and more than 10 million people unemployed, in a country where public benefits are still very precarious. At the same time, there are legitimate questions being posed concerning the legitimacy of the current government. Besides that, corruption scandals abound, bringing hope for righteous in the Brazilian democracy but also corroding the faith of Brazilians in democracy itself.

Latinobarómetro’s 2016 report shows corruption growing 17 points in six years as Brazilians’ most important issue. In 2010, 3% only chose "corruption" as the most important issue within the Brazilian context. In 2016, they were 20%, rivaling with "health" (21%). At the same time, still according to latinobarómetro’s 2016 report, support for democracy – which is falling in Latin America since 2010 – felt in brazil from 54% in 2015 to 32% in 2016.

Within this context of crisis, the country is debating tax reform, the pension system reform, a political reform, and the work legislation reform, discussing privatizations, privileges among public employees and the free federal universities. With all that and having corruption at the center of the political debate, Brazil is in some way back to 1989. It worth remember, in November 15, 1989, more than 80 million Brazilians vote for president for the first time after 20 years of military regime. This was only six days after the fall of the Berlin wall. At that moment, inflation was 45% per month, while the world was changing with the developments in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, in Beijing and South Africa. The Brazilian public debate in 1989 – a research I have publish in a book in 2013 – was marked by the ideas of an unprecedented political and economic crisis, a world in transformation and a country falling behind the global events. Seen as inflated, excessively bureaucratic and vastly inefficient, the Brazilian state was the main target of the political speech and the receipt was clear: reform and opening.

The reform of the state meant privatization, deregulation, and ending corruption and privileges. Opening meant a more liberal framework for the Brazilian international economic relations, opening the country to the global market, firms, capital and technology.

With this ideological background, a large process of political and economic reforms began in the middle of the 1980s, which would last at least for the next 20 years. In these two decades, Brazil changed its
relationship with the world, its foreign policy and its economic international relations. It also changed its economic domestic framework and its currency.

The country consolidated a new democratic regime and a new constitution, approved in 1988. Put in a more structural framework, this reformist moment relatively approximates the Brazilian case to the "new democracies" of Eastern Europe and South Africa, since all these countries experienced political liberalization processes, in the end of the cold war.

Concerning the economy, after the reforms, the Brazilian market started to import and export more and foreign participation on the economy was raised significantly. The country established important commercial agreements and modified its international agenda, accepting issues seen before as "sensitive", as intellectual propriety, environment and nuclear proliferation.

A good part of this cycle of reforms – which constituted a reformist tradition – was interrupted in 2002. Formed in the Latin American developmental tradition of cepal, the United Nations economic commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Lula’s worker’s party (pt) was always contrary to economic liberalization, sharing with the military a more statist position. Hence, with pt in the presidency, liberalizing economic reforms were stalled and federal economic agencies acted more in consonance with the developmental framework.

With this arrangement and the good global economic moment, Lula’s two mandates were time of prosperity and popularity – an 87% record approval when leaving the office, in 2010, and a lead in any presidential poll until now. If, in 2002, Lula promised the pension reform, the land reform, the work reform and others, in the "carta aos brasileiros" (letter to the Brazilians), which he made public for the Brazilian elite not to fear that he was winning the election, Lula’s presidency brought economic prosperity, the world cup, the Olympic games and, the most important thing, a real sense that politics can do something to diminish the enormous social and economic asymmetries that exist in the Brazilian society, but Lula’s government did not push for any major political or institutional reform.

Within this context, the fall of president Dilma Rousseff and the come back of the reformist debate are two sides of the same coin. It is not by chance that we have the coming back of the need for liberalizing reforms after a fiscal bankrupted state, inflation and a heterodox regime for the Brazilian economy. In fact, following this track, it is easy to identify two clear historical positions: a more reformist, liberal position, at one side, and a more developmental, statist position, at the other, probably what can historically be called a Brazilian "right" and "left", disputing power since the first half of the twentieth century, when industrial developmentalism substituted the liberal agrarian framework.

These two positions formed a kind of historical dialectics that have transformed the country to a large democracy among the ten major economies in the world. However, at least two problems, that are behind the current crisis, remain questioning brazil’s capacity to overwhelm its major social and economic injustices: the undemocratic and reactionary character of, and the lack of publicness in, these two positions of the Brazilian political spectrum.

Historically, the antidemocratic character is represented in the truculence of the right in the mid 1900s, in the military coup of 1964, in the reelection amendment of 1997, which allowed president Fernando Henrique to run again in 1998’s presidential election, and in current president Michel Temer’s conspiratorial behavior against Dilma Rousseff’s mandate. It is also represented in the left’s support or blind eye to illegal invasions of property, occupations, violent protests or Lula and Dilma’s use of public media for their own benefits.
Besides that, Brazilian right and left seem to nourish a kind of reactionary character. At the right, this reactionary character presents itself in the excessive importance given to technique in relation to politics and democracy, in the economist preponderance within the liberal speech, that puts technocratic arguments above the democratic political debate and the market above society. At the other side, the reactionary character is in the left's incapacity to admit the need for reforms, in the insistence on old heterodox formulas and in the defense of corporativism and large privileges generated by the public sector to specific social groups, as the unions and some public sectors.

Common in these two positions presented above is also the lack of concern with public benefits, be it public education, public health care, public safety and/or public justice, public transports or even sewage. The right insistence on the orthodox technocratic discourse and the left insistence on the heterodox state interventionism for economic development give no space for the notions of equal opportunity and public benefits. The result is a rich country, among the ten richest nations in the planet, with enormous social asymmetries and no, not even one, effective public benefit being provided, be it education, health care, safety, justice etc.

Brazilian liberal and developmental historical cycles have done a lot for the country. This kind of political dialectics has industrialized Brazil and placed the country among the ten richest nations in the world. But it has also dealt ambiguously with democracy and despised the effective provision of public benefits. In my view, these last two matters remain and will be the great challenges ahead of the Brazilian democracy, and dealing with them lies the sake of democracy itself in the country.

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The removal of the Dilma Rousseff Government, while raising serious issues for the strength of democratic process in Brazil, also implies the rolling back of public policy advances of the past 12 years. Replacing the entire Rousseff cabinet with more conservative, all white and all male set of ministers implies roll-backs in the limited progress in education, health and public safety. This presentation will focus on the implications for public safety policies including nation-wide efforts to reduce homicides, impunity for police violence, efforts to roll-back arms control measures and the reduction of age of criminal responsibility, among others.

It is important to remember that even before the recent municipal elections in which the center and right-wing parties made significant gains throughout the country, the Congress was already dominated by the political and ideological right. The three groups within the Camara de Deputados that best express this power – known as the “BBB” bancadas (caucuses) – Bancada da Biblia (Bible/evangelical caucus); Bancada da Bala (bullet caucus, supported by the gun lobby); and Bancada do Boi (rural, agribusiness caucus) – now have even more leverage under the Temer Government.

One advance most in danger of reversal is the Estatuto de Desarmamento, the gun control measure, originally passed in 2003, that is credited with reducing sharply the number of homicides, especially in larger cities such as Sao Paulo. The revision of the Estatuto, originally proposed by a Representative from Santa Catarina in 2012, would, among other measures, reduce the legal age for buying a gun from 25 to 21 years and reduce the regulations required for gun acquisition. Of the almost 60,000 homicides per year in Brazil 70% are caused by firearms. Reducing current controls would only increase that number. A special commission within the Camara has passed the revision. It now remains to be voted on by the entire Camara.

A second reversal is the possibility of reducing the age of adult criminal responsibility from eighteen to sixteen for “heinous” crimes, drug trafficking, torture and terrorism. Requiring a Constitutional Amendment, this measure would add to an already overcrowded prison system, expose allegedly delinquent youth to hardcore prison practices, gang dominance, and violate the defense of the rights of children and adolescents as specified in the Constitution of 1988.

The ascendancy of the Temer Government has created a climate of law and order and given permission for leniency with regard to human rights violations. For example, within the past month an appeals court judge in Sao Paulo annulled the guilty sentences of several Military Police officers who had been convicted in the 1992 Carandiru Prison massacre of 111 prisoners arguing that the officers had acted in legitimate self-defense. Likewise the new Justice Minister, Alexandre de Moraes, has taken a clear law and order stance prioritizing the fight against organized crime and securing borders as a strategy to reduce homicides instead of the more multi-faceted approach proposed by a network of researchers and public safety professionals in the prior government. The Minister has claimed that more research and diagnostics are not needed; instead, resources will be applied to purchasing equipment. And finally, the personnel of the National Secretariat for Public Safety within the Justice Ministry have experienced a total turn around, including the addition of military personnel, not seen since the 199.
A Blow to Brazilian Democracy: The Illegitimate Removal of Dilma Rousseff from Power
by Alexander Main

In the following presentation, I will first discuss the objective conditions that made former President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment possible and then explain how her removal from office was unconstitutional and the result of an illegitimate power grab. In conclusion, I’ll briefly describe what I see as the potential consequences of Rousseff’s removal, both within Brazil and regionally.

The Context

Much of the world has experienced political turbulence that can be linked in part to the economic and social aftershocks of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent global recession. In South America, the economic impact of the crisis was first felt relatively late, starting in 2011–12, but has contributed to growing instability, and in a number of cases, to major political change. The most dramatic effects so far have been in Argentina and Brazil. In both countries, severe economic challenges contributed to the end of 12 years of left-leaning government. In Argentina, hit hard by high inflation and low and negative economic growth, a democratic transition occurred at the end of 2015, when right-wing presidential candidate Mauricio Macri defeated the candidate supported by left-leaning president Cristina Kirchner in the country’s general elections. In Brazil, which has been in deep recession since 2014, an undemocratic transition took place, beginning in May of this year when the impeachment trial of Dilma Rousseff was launched by the country’s legislature. It’s worth noting that Rousseff, former president Lula da Silva’s chosen successor, was generally very popular during her first term (2011–2014). Her polling numbers remained high until 2014. Early that year, the country’s economy went into recession due in part to the impact of the global fall in commodities prices, but much more due to the government’s procyclical fiscal policies. In October of 2014, Rousseff won reelection by a relatively small margin.

Over the following months, several factors converged to create a ripe terrain for Rousseff’s impeachment. First, the economic situation worsened considerably: the recession deepened and unemployment rose substantially.

Second, a major corruption scandal exploded as the result of a judicial investigation — known as “Lava Jato” (car wash) — into a vast kickback scheme involving state oil company Petrobras, Petrobras service providers, and a network of senior politicians from various political parties. The scheme allegedly involves senior leaders of most of Brazil’s major parties, though the country’s private media has focused mostly on the involvement of members of Rousseff’s Workers’ Party (PT).

Rousseff was never directly implicated in this corruption scandal, though major private media — e.g., Rede Globo, Veja — often gave the impression that she was. In fact, Rousseff played an important role in enabling corruption investigations to move forward; for instance, through her appointment of an independent attorney general and her decision to keep in place the top federal police investigator who first launched the probe into the corruption allegations linked to Petrobras. The investigator, Márcio Anselmo, violated a statute prohibiting police authorities from talking to the media about ongoing investigations, but Rousseff, despite entreaties from members of her own party, didn’t have him removed.

Nevertheless, the combined effect of the corruption scandal and Brazil’s sinking economy, together with Rousseff’s notoriously insular governing style, contributed to her favorability ratings falling to the single digits by the end of 2015.

A third crucial factor also came into play. From mid- to late 2015, the PT’s former political allies from the
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) turned against Rousseff and her party, which led to the PT losing a working majority in the legislature. From this point on the PMDB — which then vice president Michel Temer belonged to — had the ability to remove her from power if they were prepared to game the system. And they were.

An Unconstitutional Removal
On the surface, the impeachment may have appeared to roughly comply with legal norms. Though there were legitimate concerns about the violation of Rousseff's due process rights at various junctures, the basic impeachment procedures were generally respected: the Chamber of Deputies and then the Senate voted to proceed with the impeachment, Rousseff was then temporarily suspended from office and a several-month Senate trial took place with hearings that included testimony from witnesses presented by the defense and the plaintiffs. However, Rousseff's impeachment violated basic constitutional principles. Brazil's 1988 constitution is clear: for a president to be impeached, she or he must be found guilty of a "crime of responsibility" — a concept often translated as "malversation" in English and implying a clear intent to engage in corrupt or malicious acts. But Rousseff's accusers were unable to prove that Rousseff was responsible for any such wrongdoing.

The charges filed against Rousseff were arcane — it appears that few Brazilians even knew what they were — and were soon revealed to be groundless:

- Pedalada. This charge focused on the fact that the government had engaged in an accounting practice dubbed pedalada (or "pedaling") in which the National Treasury delayed repayment of funds spent by state banks in order to finance government programs. This would result in a temporary deficit that didn't show up in the government's accounts during a several-month period. Rousseff's accusers suggested that this was an illegal loan carried out in order to deliberately deceive the public and temporarily conceal the true state of the national budget. The charge doesn't hold water, however, since: 1) there's no precedent for identifying this sort of transfer of funds as a loan, and no contract exists suggesting the existence of a loan; 2) there's no evidence that there was ever any intent to mask the reality of public accounts; 3) pedalada was a common practice that occurred under other Brazilian administrations (including those of former presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula da Silva) without provoking any serious controversy; 4) there's no evidence that Rousseff herself was directly responsible for the pedalada occurring. According to an independent technical report commissioned by Brazil's Senate: "There was not any identified act by the president that would have contributed directly or indirectly to the delays."4
- Fiscal decrees. Rousseff was also accused of issuing fiscal decrees that could have resulted in state spending that surpassed the annual budget of 2015, which would have violated Brazil's Fiscal Responsibility Law. However, Rousseff's decree never led to a budget deficit since the congress approved supplementary funding for the government. The charge was simply based on the fact that this deficit might have occurred.

It's worth noting that the federal prosecutor assigned to investigate Rousseff's alleged offenses found that she wasn't guilty of breaking any laws.5 Indeed, the charges against Rousseff were so flimsy that they were only minimally discussed during the impeachment hearings. At the end of Rousseff's Senate trial, the plaintiffs resorted to arguing that the impeachment was valid because the president was doing a bad job and making the country ungovernable.

The problem with this argument is that, whether or not it's true, Brazil is not a parliamentary democracy. The Constitution establishes a presidential system with a strong executive elected directly by Brazil's citizens. There is no motion of censure mechanism that would make the head of state politically accountable to the legislature. Though Brazil's parliament went through the procedural motions of an impeachment,
the trial effectively resulted in a motion of censure in which Dilma was removed for purely political reasons, and not the purest of political reasons.

**An Illegitimate Power Grab**
The impeachment campaign against Rousseff finds its origin, first of all, in a political bargaining maneuver; second, in an act of political retribution against Rousseff and her Workers' Party. The initial leader of Rousseff’s impeachment campaign was Eduardo Cunha, a PMDB leader and, from February 2015 to early July 2016, the powerful president of the Chamber of Deputies. In late 2015, Cunha underwent an investigation by the Chamber’s ethics committee following revelations of the existence of Swiss bank accounts under his name with tens of millions of dollars in unaccounted funds.

Cunha accepted impeachment petitions targeting Rousseff filed by lawyers close to the Social Democratic Party of Brazil, or PSDB (whose presidential candidate contested Rousseff’s electoral victory in 2014). Cunha made clear that he hoped to use the petitions as a bargaining chip to put an end to the investigation targeting him. However, Rousseff refused to enter into negotiation with Cunha, and the PT went ahead and backed the committee’s investigation, allowing it to move forward. As a result, Cunha pursued the impeachment campaign much more aggressively.

These developments coincided with the departure of the PMDB from its parliamentary alliance with the PT. As a result, the PT no longer could count on the support of a majority of the Congress.

There were other reasons that motivated the impeachment, all of which highlight its illegitimate nature.

One clear motivation was legal self-preservation. As leaked recordings revealed, key politicians driving the impeachment campaign wanted to “stop the bleeding”; they hoped to remove Rousseff to be able to intervene and prevent corruption investigations from targeting them and their political allies.

Many of those driving the impeachment campaign were embroiled in corruption scandals. Cunha was removed from the Chamber of Deputies and is now in jail awaiting trial. Sixty percent of the members of Brazil’s parliament face a variety of criminal charges. Temer himself has been charged with violating electoral finance legislation and is suspected of involvement in other acts of corruption.

A second major motivation for Rousseff’s removal was to enable right-wing sectors to take over the government and carry out a veritable neoliberal revolution that doesn’t have the support of the Brazilian people.

Temer essentially recognized this in remarks made at the business-oriented Council of the Americas in New York City in September 2016. He explained that he and his party colleagues began to seek Rousseff’s removal because she stood in the way of a radical austerity plan — known as “Bridge to the Future” — backed by right-wing parties and financial elites. Rousseff won re-election on a strident anti-neoliberal platform (which she largely failed to follow through with). The Temer team has no mandate for the radical neoliberal reforms that they’re pushing, the most egregious of which is constitutional amendment (PEC 55) that human rights advocates have signaled will set back social gains for at least two decades, increasing inequality levels and hurting Brazil’s poorest. Among other things, this reform establishes tight caps on social spending for the next twenty years and lead to drastic cuts in the national budgets for health and education. Needless to say, Brazil’s people haven’t been consulted about this amendment, but it has received high marks from national and international financial sectors.

In addition, Temer’s government has promoted a profoundly reactionary agenda from a social perspective, reminiscent in some ways of what many expect to see with the next US presidential administration. As soon as Dilma was temporarily suspended in May 2016, Temer appointed an all-white, all-male conservative cabinet. Before the impeachment trial even started, Temer did away with socially oriented ministries including the Ministries of Culture,
Human Rights, Racial Equality, Women, and Agricultural Development (two of which were later reestablished following public protests and denunciations).

Though they have no elected mandate, Temer and his team have begun carrying out an aggressive rollback of 12 years of Workers' Party policies.

The consequences
It is difficult to measure the potential long-term impact of Rousseff's removal at such an early stage, but it is clear that we are presently witnessing a deepening crisis of legitimacy in Brazil, with increasing levels of popular discontent and increasing repression and criminalization of protesters and social movements, such as Brazil's largest social movement group, the Landless Workers Movement (MST by its Portuguese initials). Brazil's political future is highly uncertain, with major parties mostly discredited and the PT's most popular political figure — and leading potential candidate in the 2018 elections — Lula, under constant attack by the media and facing a corruption investigation led by a very biased investigating judge. An alarming number of middle and upper-middle class Brazilian citizens are even voicing nostalgia for the country's military dictatorship. In the short-term, we can expect inequality and poverty to soar — a combined effect of the economic situation and of the social and economic policies of the Temer government — and political instability to grow more acute.

At the regional level, Rousseff's impeachment and the other political changes in Brazil can also be expected to have a profound impact. Brazil had been a pillar of a relatively recent regional economic integration movement — starting with the Cardoso administration and to a greater degree under the Lula administration; the Temer administration has made clear its intention of abandoning this project and, instead, favoring bilateral trade agreements, including within the Mercosur trade bloc. Furthermore, in its diplomacy, Brazil had played an important mediating role vis-a-vis regional disputes, and had effectively positioned itself as a diplomatic counterweight to the US political agenda in the region. The positions adopted by Temer and his foreign minister, José Serra, have suggested that Brazil will no longer exercise this function of counterweight on the regional stage. Serra in particular has made a point of allying himself with US objectives in the region.

Of even greater concern should be the precedent set by the unconstitutional and illegitimate removal of Rousseff, seen as a “soft” coup by many Brazilians and others in the region. The region's democratic stability had already been rocked by the military coup d'etat in Honduras (2009) and another “soft” coup in Paraguay (2012), both of which targeted left-leaning heads of state, and both instigated by right-wing legislatures. Many other countries in the region only recently emerged from dictatorship and exhibit institutional vulnerabilities that can easily be exploited by national elites seeking a return to the status quo ante and emboldened by the Honduran, Paraguayan, and Brazilian examples.

In sum, Rousseff's removal is a perilous source of instability, within Brazil and regionally, and could help pave the way to a return to the darker, stormier days prior to the democratization wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
About

Virtual Dialogues with Latin America is a series of events organized by the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Arizona. The goal is to provide an expository medium by which leading experts in Latin America can interact with students and faculty, not just at the University of Arizona, but worldwide as the events are streamed and make use of social media platforms. The dialogues address pertinent issues that affect Latin America today. Just as we rely on institutional support from the aforementioned organizations and institutions, we also work with and rely on partners throughout Latin America.

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