VIRTUAL DIALOGUES WITH LATIN AMERICA
Regional Integration in the Americas
Challenges and Perspectives
Regional Integration in the Americas

The Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Arizona, in collaboration with Asuntos del Sur and Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO-Argentina), with the generous support of the Confluence Center for Creative Thinking presents the second in a series of Virtual Dialogues: Regional Integration in the Americas - Challenges and Perspectives.

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PRESENTERS

The Pacific Alliance: A Hopeful Regional Trade Bloc
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Debating Regionalism in Latin America
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Why Integrate?
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The Pacific Alliance is a Latin American trade bloc comprised formally of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru with Costa Rica as another potential member as well as 14 other observer States. The Pacific Alliance claims to strive for:

1. Deep economic integration with an emphasis on the relatively free movement of goods, services, capital and persons.
2. Strengthening of the economies of member states with an aim at achieving greater welfare, overcoming socio-economic inequality, and achieving greater social inclusion.
3. Becoming a platform for political articulation as well as economic and trade integration and projecting these strengths to the Asia-Pacific region.

The Pacific Alliance is hardly the first or only regional trade bloc to emerge in Latin America. MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market, which is comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Bolivia) and ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples’ Trade Treaty, which is comprised of Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Venezuela) certainly come to mind in the discussion. However, although it may be too early to tell, it seems that these four countries are poised to convert the rhetoric of integration into action.

All four countries have relatively strong economies with comparatively low unemployment rates for the region. They are also the four fastest growing economies in the region and together represent 36% of the region’s GDP with about half of the region’s exports. Inclusive of this, the World Banks’ 2013 Doing Business report ranked all four countries as the top four to do business. These are also four countries that have placed an emphasis on liberating movement of goods evinced by their high number of bi-and multi-lateral agreements.

However, despite these strengths and seeming commitment to liberation of trade and desire for regional cooperation, legitimate questions and concern have arisen as to the viability of the agreements. A key issue is that there is not a high amount of complimentary exchange within their economies as all four are heavily dependent on primary exports. Issues of distance and dealing with the heavy regulation needed for a significant portion of products will also pose potential roadblocks and how these countries work to resolve these potential problems will be critical to the success of the trade alliance. Furthermore, if other trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are ratified it could cause legitimate conflicts (all four PA members are candidates for the TPP).

A critical test for The Pacific Alliance was passed on February of 2014 with the passing of a 92% reduction on tariffs within the countries. This is a move that observer states, particularly the United States and Japan have greeted with enthusiasm. However, these early moves should be greeted with cautioned optimism considering that the agreement has actually come late (it was due to be ratified before the end of 2013). MERCOSUR, which has stagnated considerably in recent years started off with a few promising years.

Reasons for this agreement, as officially stated in their mission statement and as revealed by diplomats and officials in private conversations are to promote trade with Asian countries, which have risen as major trade partners. However, members of MERCOSUR have stated that this is a power play hoping to marginalize more leftist oriented countries in the region. It would appear that there is a real desire for increasing trade with Asia; however, a trained observer of international agreements would not summarily disregard regional power dynamics.
Regional integration in Latin America has a long history that dates back to the early days of the nascent republics in the XIX century. It is during the post-cold war period in the 1990s where regionalism gained new momentum as a means to reshape the terms of international relations of countries in a new context of a globalizing capitalism and a dominant neo-liberal market ideology. The Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA) project was the iconic initiative that sought to integrate the western hemisphere as a free market space, emulating the integration model of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). MERCOSUR was also established in 1991 with a heavy initial emphasis on trade liberalization.

The demise of the FTAA project at the 2005 Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata, due to the opposition of the governments of the MERCOSUR states, was a turning point in the political landscape of regionalism in Latin America. This opened a new scenario where new regional integration initiatives proliferated alongside established ones like MERCOSUR, NAFTA (in the case of Mexico in the North American context) and CAN. The new regional groupings that came into being in this emerging context are the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) in 2004, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR, earlier called South American Community of Nations) in 2008, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in 2010 and the Pacific Alliance in 2011. Many of these countries also signed free trade agreements. This is the case of the Central American and Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement with the United States (CADTA-DR) signed in 2004, as well as bilateral FTAs with the US, with the EU and China, to cite a few.

Such a proliferation of regional and sub-regional groupings is indicative of at least two situations. First, that all governments understand that regional cooperation constitutes an essential component of their international relations. The changing conditions of the global context require that developing and emerging economies from the Latin America combine efforts protect themselves from the effects of a financial crises initiated in the industrial countries, manage their insertion in the new patterns of global trade and finance and influence the new political agendas and debates on global governance issues. Second, the plurality of such different regional integration mechanisms that emerged following the demise of the FTAA project also suggests that absence of a shared view of what constitutes the preferred approach or “model” of regional integration to be invested in. Market-based approaches based on free trade and export-oriented strategies of international insertion co-exist with state-driven processes in line with developmental and social goals. It is no longer the case that regional integration is taken necessarily as a mechanism to liberalize trade in line with the prerogatives of neoliberal ideology. Regionalism becomes instead a set of experimental processes driven by political agendas in line with needs set by economic and social factors.

This makes a unique setting in which everyone agrees that regional cooperation is needed yet no one assumes that there is necessarily one way of thinking about it. The region debates itself. This is what makes this presentation timely. Many questions emerge, such as how to account for manifold of regional integration initiatives currently at play? What do they mean in terms of regionalism as an international political strategy of Latin American states and societies? In this presentation I would like to identify what I consider some of the main themes that currently agglutinate the ongoing debate on regionalism in Latin America. It does not pretend to be an exhaustive list, yet it
is nevertheless largely representative of the general spirit of where this debate is at the time. By no means does this suggest that regionalism should no be also addressed from the light of other considerations not addressed in this presentation due to time limit.

Change and continuities

What’s new and old about them current regional and sub-regional groupings? On the one hand, there’s consensus that there a break away from the past, that something is new in Latin American regionalism. This view stresses the new conditions for political autonomy and cohesion attained over the last decade, which redefines the current and future conditions of Latin American countries in a changing global context. This is seen with UNASUR and CELAC, which introduce new platforms of political dialogue, conflict resolution that create conditions for building common views and positions with respect regional and extra regional issues. UNASUR was an agile mechanism of conflict resolution in conflicts that challenged the democratic stability in Bolivia and Ecuador, but also diplomatic disputes as those that took place between Colombia and Venezuela, and Colombia and Ecuador. Likewise, ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC played important roles in defining common positions with regards the condemnation of the incident of the detention of the airplane of president Evo Morales in Europe, or the defense of the inviolability of the Ecuadorian embassy in the UK in relation to the Julian Assange issue. The solidarity of MERCOSUR and UNASUR with the Argentine demand that the UK complies with UN resolutions to resume dialogue over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas is another example of the new role that regional and sub-regional groupings currently play at the level of political coordination and convergence. The views that claim there is something fundamentally new in the region debate the best concept to characterize this process, as post-neoliberal, post-hegemonic, post-liberal regionalism.

On the other hand, many stress the continuities that exist in regional integration mechanisms, whether old or new. The Pacific Alliance is a continuation of the market centered agenda of integration that was pursued in the FTAA project and later through the bilateral FTAs. Moreover, other views that emphasize the continuities claim that neither of all regional integration mechanisms currently at play has been able to prevent and overcome the trends towards extractivism that affects all countries. Dependence on natural resource for exports continues to be a defining feature of Latin America and regional integration has either not modified this, or has even encouraged it, as in the case of the Pacific Alliance.

Is there unity in plurality?
The coexistence of multiple sub-regional schemes opens the question of whether they constitute different approaches, or “models”, of integration that compete with each other, or if they are particular manifestations of a common phenomenon or condition that permeates all of them even if in different ways or intensity. The view which sees competition of models of integration presupposes that the state has sufficient autonomy and margins to set the policy priorities and goals of regionalism. Namely, that there is room for agency in shaping the scope, agendas and processes of regional integration. This view highlights the different character of initiatives like Mercosur from the Pacific Alliance, since it is advanced by neo-developmental governments as a means to industrialization.

There is another view which sees all integration schemes as particular responses to a common set of external conditions. What is common to all of them is the external context in which Latin American counties are situated. This refers to the changes in the global political economy, marked particularly by the ascendace of emerging economies from the South and a relative decline of traditional centers of power in the US and Europe. The rise of China changes the terms of commercial, financial (and presumably also political) relations that Latin American economies have with this country. Moreover, the Asia-Pacific regional concentrates 60 % of global trade, which modifies the outlooks and priorities of Latin American countries with respect their options of international insertion. This set the parameters for regionalism in Latin America. According to this view then, this can be confirmed most clearly in east oriented initiatives like the Pacific Alliance, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but also in integration mechanisms such at the South American Regional Infrastructure Integration (IIRSA) in the UNASUR framework. Largely financed by Brazil, infrastructure integration will enable physical connectivity throughout South America, facilitating intra-regional trade, but equally creating ways for Atlantic countries in the region to direct their exports.
to China through the Pacific at lower costs. Thus, under this light, the differences between the Pacific Alliance, UNASUR-IIRSA and MERCOSUR are less significant. Regionalism is being oriented to support and foster the changing patterns of trade and investments that redefine the geo-economic and geopolitical relations between Latin America and China/Asia-Pacific. This view tends to be skeptical of the possibility of balancing the trade relations of Mercosur economies with Asia in order to prevent and overcome reliance commodity exports.

**How do regional schemes interrelate?**

This debate centers on how the plurality of existing regional and sub-regional integration mechanisms interact with each other. One way was already suggested in the form of competition. Thus, fragmentation and competition describes Latin America from this point of view. This has been a commonly accepted assumption. Yet, there is another understanding that is also possible. Different schemes are define particular spaces for consensus-building. Views and agendas that are secured in one space influence the political process in other spaces, by emulation, competition, transformation. This is even clearer when some states participate in multiple regional initiatives. Venezuela is a member of ALBA, MERCOSUR and UNASUR. Presidential candidate Michele Bachelet in Chile is committed to maintaining membership in the Pacific Alliance, whilst strengthening ties with MERCOSUR countries in an eventual victory. Likewise, different countries have particular policy issues with they advocate in a regional debate (rights of nature by Bolivia and Ecuador, Human rights by Argentina, defense cooperation and technical cooperation by Brazil, social programs by Venezuela, drug and trafficking issues by Colombia and Mexico, an South American investment and dispute resolution mechanism by Ecuador and a South American development bank by Venezuela, to cite a few examples). This means that the regional process builds on the inter-dynamics of sub-regional groupings and issue-specific advocacy by governments. From this latter point of view, there is no fragmentation of the regional integration agenda. Instead, there is plurality of inter-related processes. One implication of this view is that plurality need not result in loss of regional cohesion. In fact, it can be indicative of region-building rather than fragmentation.

**Resilience and continuity**

Finally, there is another theme that concentrates much of the debate on regionalism in Latin America which deals with the resilience and continuity of ongoing regional schemes. What does continuity depend on? Can UNASUR, ALBA and the Pacific Alliance survive in the face of changes of government in their member states? MERCOSUR has proved to be resilient, yet not without complications (for example when dealing with the governance of common rivers, the administering of trade tensions derived from industrialization, etc). As mentioned, a socialist government of Bachelet would keep supporting the Pacific Alliance. Also, UNASUR is composed of states governed by leaderships of wide different political ideologies, and particularly CELAC which has Cuba as one of its members (CELAC brings in Cuba in and leaves out the US and Canada, contesting to a certain extent the OAS as the primary site of political articulation in the inter-American system). Are current institutional settings adequate to ensure continuity and regional convergence? With the exception of MERCOSUR (even if it does not have supranational competencies), UNASUR, ALBA, the Pacific Alliance and CELAC have lean and flexible institutional frameworks. This is often pointed out as vulnerability. Yet, it is also the case that without political leadership and some degree of consensus, no political institutions will ensure that cooperation is sustained into the future. Latin American states and societies are currently debating themselves in the hope that new bases of consensus will emerge on which to build strong and legitimate regional institutions.

**Conclusion**

Regionalism in a post-hegemonic context is about experimentation, pragmatic adaptation and soul-searching. Overall, despite their differences, all governments understand the importance of asserting their autonomy in the global scene through regional cooperation. There is the view that Latin America can deal with its own problems and make its own decision. While there may not be agreement in how to do this, there is conviction that Latin American will be the only ones capable of it. With all its integration schemes, regionalism is more like a forum than a pre-established plan that awaits implementation. On the contrary, regional cohesion is the product of diversity, debates, conflicts and consensus building.
Over the past two decades, the architecture of Latin American integration and cooperation has become increasingly complicated. There has been a proliferation of new organizations, the most recent of which is the Pacific Alliance (Alianza del Pacífico), which groups Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico in an effort to organize trade and political relations with the nations of Asia in a manner that will increase trade and favor the interests of the member states. The new group overlaps with and may be in conflict with already existing groups, such as Mercosur and the Andean Group. At the same time, international groups that are not limited to trade relations have been created, such as the Union of the South (UNASUR) and CELAC (Congress of Latin America and Caribbean). The last two appear to conflict with the purposes of the older Organization of American States (OAS/OEA).

In each of these organizations, as with older ones, such as NAFTA (The North American Free Trade Agreement), it is possible to evaluate their progress, or the lack of progress, and whether or not each of them has achieved the goals they announced in creating the organization. NAFTA, for example, has been a huge success. Mercosur, on the other hand, began with nearly a decade of robust cooperation and marked increases in intra-regional trade, only to suffer a decade in which very little progress has been made. The Pacific Alliance has not existed long enough to evaluate, but it has announced an agenda that appears quite modest and practical, such as negotiation of rules of origin and other administrative matters that have proved to be relatively free of tension as matters of negotiation in older organizations.

Aside from matters of trade and investment, which are fairly easy to track, the question that is central to an understanding of why some organizations prosper and others do not, or that some, like Mercosur, prosper for a period and then stagnate, is how any of these organizations satisfy the interests of their members. It is not an easy question and requires an examination of members's foreign policies and an estimate of their strategic goals. In other words, aside from membership in various organizations, what do the players want to achieve in their international affairs. Is integration a goal of many of the nations in Latin America?

The stated desire for integration in the region is as old as Bolivar. His original concept for union or integration among the newly independent states of Latin America did not prosper and there were few efforts in Latin America during the 19th century to push the Bolivarian ideal. At the end of the century, the United States became part of the process and was instrumental in the creation of the Pan American Union, which began as an effort to create a hemispheric customs union. That idea did not prosper, largely as a result of firm opposition by several countries, especially Argentina. The PAU continued for half a century as a forum for discussing subjects of common interest. It was transformed into the Organization of American States in 1949 and began a slow process of institutionalization. The fact that for many years it was manipulated by the U.S. and is today considered a tool of U.S. policy has limited its effectiveness in dealing with sensitive political issues, such as democracy. Resistance to the exercise of U.S. influence in the OAS has been growing since the end of the Cold War. In the same manner, U.S. efforts to create a defense community, beginning with World War II and continuing through the Cold War, have as a consequence of Latin American resistance – not to mention the absence of external threats to the hemisphere - been virtually eliminated and defense is no longer an issue for discussion within
the OAS. UNASUR and the South American Defense Community are explicit efforts to replace the OAS and U.S. influence with a South American defense community. Here, again, the absence of an external threat makes setting an agenda for cooperation difficult.

The key to what is happening in Latin America since the end of the Cold War is that the nations of the region no longer feel constrained by the Manichean straitjacket of the bipolar conflict. Since 1990 there has been a growing awareness throughout Latin America of the possibilities of new space for them in the international system, space in which they can operate with growing autonomy. In other words, there is a gradual, growing sense in all of the nations of the hemisphere of the possibility of action – of agency – on their own behalf. While the process has been moving with different speeds in different countries, all of the governments appear self-consciously eager to act. It is this awareness and the growing capacity for action in the international system, more than any loss of power by the United States, that marks the end of U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

The burgeoning sense of agency in Latin America also has complicated the efforts to create trade blocs or groups. Nations do not merely trade. They do many things. They have attributes of soft power as well as hard power that gives them leverage and capacity for action. Trade policy must be understood in this broader context. Just to take three obvious examples, trade is important to Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, but it does not come close to determining or explaining their broader national strategic objectives. It should come as no surprise that the strategic objectives of nations diverge or, to put it in more positive language, do not converge over a broad range of issues. The absence of convergence makes trade negotiations difficult. These differences must be kept in mind if we are to understand why the dream of integrating Latin America has been and will continue to be so difficult to achieve.

There are two additional obstacles to regional integration that can only be mentioned briefly in this note.

First, Latin American integration will not be possible unless and until there is a broad consensus in the region concerning broad strategic objectives. Anti-Americanism is not a sufficient strategic objective to forge meaningful integration in the region. For that reason, ALBA, which claims to focus on social integration and a set of progressive social objectives, has set itself deliberately against the United States. That is not a viable national or regional goal. In the same sense, a regional trade integration system cannot succeed if it excludes the U.S. There has to be some way to deal with the U.S. in a constructive manner, so that the community of nations in the hemisphere includes its largest member.

Second, most of the nations of Latin America have enjoyed a decade or more of historically high prices and intense demand for raw materials. More the most part, the nations in the region have not known how to turn the bonanza into long term goals. Living off the temporary bonanza of a commodities boom is known as the Dutch Disease. Profligate spending of a temporary windfall or bonanza cannot pass for a long term strategic plan. Joining together into a band of commodity exporting countries to protect prices will not serve as a strategic plan. In fact, given the earlier comments on the rise of agency, it is ironic that several governments in the region have discussed joining forces to protect their commodities. But, that is to sacrifice agency to the international market and at the very time that the international community is most open to their constructive participation. Like basing a national policy on anti-Americanism, creating a cartel of raw material exporters is an anachronistic response to the current situation. The nations of Latin America must formulate a more coherent and strategic approach to their political economy.
Regional integration projects are not static entities, but rather organic organizations that adapt, shift and react to external and internal pressures and consequently, rather than examine them as static, resolute entities we should view them as dynamic and responsive structures. This is important because in Latin America today there are number of projects, or rather starting points that could potentially redefine the region.

It is critical to keep in mind that Latin America, unlike Europe and Asia wherein substantial regional integration has been seen, is a primary exporter of natural resources, thus broad comparisons amongst the regions are not easily warranted. Compared to Europe, for example, by the time the European Commission was signed inter-European trade already constituted 40% to 50% of trade within the region, and unlike Latin America, the majority of exports were manufactured goods. Similarly, in Asia it was a global value change that drove the process of integration and built it from the bottom up. These are characteristics not seen in Latin America.

What is evident in Latin America is a certain degree of historical economic homogeneity in that ISI (Import Substitution Industrialization) and state planning were common concurrent features of many Latin American countries’ economies. Furthermore, the establishment of the Latin American Free Trade Association in 1960, reorganized as the Latin American Integration Association in 1980, demonstrate a pattern of movement towards economic integration based on natural resource exports to the world. However, whereas before this pattern was based on the commonality of ISI and coherence in state planning, contemporary integration is of a different variety.

In general, there are four major regional integration initiatives to be examined:

1. Mercosur, which began the 1990s and is primarily a regional trade bloc, and while it has lost steam in recent years, should still be taken into account.
2. The Pacific Alliance is a nascent player, but comprises four economic hard hitters (Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) and perhaps unlike Mercosur, has a strong outward focus.
3. ALBA (The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America - Peoples’ Trade Treaty) represents a different type of regional bloc with its emphasis on social and soft power. Rather than advocate for cooperation in trade as its primary goal, it instead seeks to redefine social relations across the nations and outwardly in its power dynamics.
4. UNASUR, a Brazilian led project, promotes geographical connectivity. Like ALBA it contrasts heavily against other trade agreements with less of an emphasis on trade, and a much more profound basis on development of Latin America as a region. This is manifest through myriad of highway, port, and road projects all seeking to further physically link Latin America. However, unlike ALBA, which is largely political, this is based on supporting the physical nature of integration.
Both ALBA and UNASUR seek to recapture this notion of ‘Latin America’. A significant part of this effort is in deemphasizing continuity not only with the Free Trade Act of the Americas, but with U.S. led efforts at integration, which have been heavily associated with neoliberalism. Unlike Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, the primary goals of ALBA and UNASUR are not based on trade agreements, but rather on the wider notion of political and geographical unity. Within these two non-trade focused groups there are differences in that while ALBA advocates for political and social unity UNASUR is much more focused on tangible construction of connections.

Another key point to consider is that all these countries are individual nation-states and thus come to the table with their own goals and concerns. This is not a new phenomenon as even in the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) one can see where individual states have acted solely in self-interest. Rather, what molds and affects how regional blocs form and maintain themselves, at least in Latin America, is the dominant patterns of specialization. These patterns are path dependent, meaning that any prolonged examination must allow for change in patterns, but even such, we can see what the mode of specialization plays a significantly more relevant role in the nature of regional blocs. China, both in its physical presence and source of augmented demand, is playing a major role and certainly affecting the conversation on integration.

China, with its increasing demand for foodstuffs and commodities, is helping create a condition of high export prices, which has benefitted much of Latin America. This same Chinese craving for Latin American exports is leading to investment in development and infrastructure projects such as an over-land East/West trade route to augment the carrying capacity of the Panamanian and proposed Nicaraguan canals. In speaking of regional groups in Latin America, which have until recently have been dominated by the ostensible desire for augmented trade, it helps to break down relationships into roughly four sub-categories:

1. North and Central America - This would represent the countries of CAFTA (Central Free Trade Agreement) and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). These relationships are very much defined by the North-South pattern of dominance and share a relationship of relative dependency with the United States.

2. Panama and Costa Rica - Panama’s exports rely...
heavily on the canal and consequently there is an interest in promoting East/West trade. China is perhaps more relevant here than anywhere else, but not necessarily in quantity of purchases. So high is the demand that, as mentioned earlier, China is seeking expansion of trade routes via an overland option in Colombia. Likewise, Intel, which has been in Costa Rica for almost two decades, represents a significant portion of Costa Rican exports with a strong market share in the Southeast.

3. Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru- These four countries have recently formed the Pacific Alliance represent a Pacific bias seeking to get into this market. While the Pacific Alliance makes considerable internal changes (most notably a tariff reduction on 92% of goods), its goal is to invite Pacific trade partners.

4. Atlantic Bias/ Mercosur - In contrast to this Pacific bias, there is also an Atlantic bias revolving around the Mercosur. This Atlantic bias has a stronger emphasis on foodstuff exports and manufacturing within the region, but features a heavier political component than the Pacific Alliance.

In conclusion there are two important questions raised: how do we unite these disparate entities and as an addendum to the former question, should there be an emphasis on unity? There is this prevalent assumption that regional unity requires economic and political cohesion, yet what is seen now is a system in which countries fit into their roles based on their strengths and political goals. Once again, it seems apropos to reiterate that regional blocs are not rigid formations, but rather fluid and dynamic organizations responding to any number of factors.
Participant Bios

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David Gantz is a graduate of Harvard College and Stanford Law School. He served with the U.S. Agency for International Development law reform project in Costa Rica and as a law clerk with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. At the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, from 1970-1977, he was the chief lawyer responsible for Inter-American affairs. From 1977-1993, he practiced international trade and corporate law in Washington, D.C. He joined the law faculty at Arizona in 1993. He has served as a binational panelist under the dispute resolution provisions of the CFTA and NAFTA and has written extensively on NAFTA, NAFTA and WTO dispute resolution, regional trade agreements, foreign bribery and other international trade, investment and environmental law issues. His book “Regional Trade Agreements: Law, Policy and Practice” was published by Carolina Academic Press in 2009.

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Joseph Tulchin

Joseph S. Tulchin served as Director of the Wilson Center Latin American Program from 1989 through 2005. His areas of expertise are U.S. foreign policy, inter-American relations, contemporary Latin America, strategic planning, and social science research methodology. Dr. Tulchin was previously Professor of History and Director of International Programs at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he edited the Latin American Research Review, and served for seven years as a faculty member of Yale University. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Harvard University, read history at Peterhouse, Cambridge, and received his B.A. from Amherst College. Throughout his long career he has taught or lectured in nearly every country in the hemisphere, published more than 100 scholarly articles and more than seventy books.

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